import uuid
from webob.cookies import CookieProfile
from zope.interface import implementer
from pyramid._compat import bytes_, urlparse, text_
from pyramid.exceptions import BadCSRFOrigin, BadCSRFToken
from pyramid.interfaces import ICSRFStoragePolicy
from pyramid.settings import aslist
from pyramid.util import SimpleSerializer, is_same_domain, strings_differ
[docs]
@implementer(ICSRFStoragePolicy)
class LegacySessionCSRFStoragePolicy(object):
"""A CSRF storage policy that defers control of CSRF storage to the
session.
This policy maintains compatibility with legacy ISession implementations
that know how to manage CSRF tokens themselves via
``ISession.new_csrf_token`` and ``ISession.get_csrf_token``.
Note that using this CSRF implementation requires that
a :term:`session factory` is configured.
.. versionadded:: 1.9
"""
[docs]
def new_csrf_token(self, request):
""" Sets a new CSRF token into the session and returns it. """
return request.session.new_csrf_token()
[docs]
def get_csrf_token(self, request):
"""Returns the currently active CSRF token from the session,
generating a new one if needed."""
return request.session.get_csrf_token()
[docs]
def check_csrf_token(self, request, supplied_token):
""" Returns ``True`` if the ``supplied_token`` is valid."""
expected_token = self.get_csrf_token(request)
return not strings_differ(
bytes_(expected_token), bytes_(supplied_token)
)
[docs]
@implementer(ICSRFStoragePolicy)
class SessionCSRFStoragePolicy(object):
"""A CSRF storage policy that persists the CSRF token in the session.
Note that using this CSRF implementation requires that
a :term:`session factory` is configured.
``key``
The session key where the CSRF token will be stored.
Default: `_csrft_`.
.. versionadded:: 1.9
"""
_token_factory = staticmethod(lambda: text_(uuid.uuid4().hex))
def __init__(self, key='_csrft_'):
self.key = key
[docs]
def new_csrf_token(self, request):
""" Sets a new CSRF token into the session and returns it. """
token = self._token_factory()
request.session[self.key] = token
return token
[docs]
def get_csrf_token(self, request):
"""Returns the currently active CSRF token from the session,
generating a new one if needed."""
token = request.session.get(self.key, None)
if not token:
token = self.new_csrf_token(request)
return token
[docs]
def check_csrf_token(self, request, supplied_token):
""" Returns ``True`` if the ``supplied_token`` is valid."""
expected_token = self.get_csrf_token(request)
return not strings_differ(
bytes_(expected_token), bytes_(supplied_token)
)
[docs]
@implementer(ICSRFStoragePolicy)
class CookieCSRFStoragePolicy(object):
"""An alternative CSRF implementation that stores its information in
unauthenticated cookies, known as the 'Double Submit Cookie' method in the
`OWASP CSRF guidelines <https://www.owasp.org/index.php/
Cross-Site_Request_Forgery_(CSRF)_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet#
Double_Submit_Cookie>`_. This gives some additional flexibility with
regards to scaling as the tokens can be generated and verified by a
front-end server.
.. versionadded:: 1.9
.. versionchanged: 1.10
Added the ``samesite`` option and made the default ``'Lax'``.
"""
_token_factory = staticmethod(lambda: text_(uuid.uuid4().hex))
def __init__(
self,
cookie_name='csrf_token',
secure=False,
httponly=False,
domain=None,
max_age=None,
path='/',
samesite='Lax',
):
serializer = SimpleSerializer()
self.cookie_profile = CookieProfile(
cookie_name=cookie_name,
secure=secure,
max_age=max_age,
httponly=httponly,
path=path,
domains=[domain],
serializer=serializer,
samesite=samesite,
)
self.cookie_name = cookie_name
[docs]
def new_csrf_token(self, request):
""" Sets a new CSRF token into the request and returns it. """
token = self._token_factory()
request.cookies[self.cookie_name] = token
def set_cookie(request, response):
self.cookie_profile.set_cookies(response, token)
request.add_response_callback(set_cookie)
return token
[docs]
def get_csrf_token(self, request):
"""Returns the currently active CSRF token by checking the cookies
sent with the current request."""
bound_cookies = self.cookie_profile.bind(request)
token = bound_cookies.get_value()
if not token:
token = self.new_csrf_token(request)
return token
[docs]
def check_csrf_token(self, request, supplied_token):
""" Returns ``True`` if the ``supplied_token`` is valid."""
expected_token = self.get_csrf_token(request)
return not strings_differ(
bytes_(expected_token), bytes_(supplied_token)
)
[docs]
def get_csrf_token(request):
"""Get the currently active CSRF token for the request passed, generating
a new one using ``new_csrf_token(request)`` if one does not exist. This
calls the equivalent method in the chosen CSRF protection implementation.
.. versionadded :: 1.9
"""
registry = request.registry
csrf = registry.getUtility(ICSRFStoragePolicy)
return csrf.get_csrf_token(request)
[docs]
def new_csrf_token(request):
"""Generate a new CSRF token for the request passed and persist it in an
implementation defined manner. This calls the equivalent method in the
chosen CSRF protection implementation.
.. versionadded :: 1.9
"""
registry = request.registry
csrf = registry.getUtility(ICSRFStoragePolicy)
return csrf.new_csrf_token(request)
[docs]
def check_csrf_token(
request, token='csrf_token', header='X-CSRF-Token', raises=True
):
"""Check the CSRF token returned by the
:class:`pyramid.interfaces.ICSRFStoragePolicy` implementation against the
value in ``request.POST.get(token)`` (if a POST request) or
``request.headers.get(header)``. If a ``token`` keyword is not supplied to
this function, the string ``csrf_token`` will be used to look up the token
in ``request.POST``. If a ``header`` keyword is not supplied to this
function, the string ``X-CSRF-Token`` will be used to look up the token in
``request.headers``.
If the value supplied by post or by header cannot be verified by the
:class:`pyramid.interfaces.ICSRFStoragePolicy`, and ``raises`` is
``True``, this function will raise an
:exc:`pyramid.exceptions.BadCSRFToken` exception. If the values differ
and ``raises`` is ``False``, this function will return ``False``. If the
CSRF check is successful, this function will return ``True``
unconditionally.
See :ref:`auto_csrf_checking` for information about how to secure your
application automatically against CSRF attacks.
.. versionadded:: 1.4a2
.. versionchanged:: 1.7a1
A CSRF token passed in the query string of the request is no longer
considered valid. It must be passed in either the request body or
a header.
.. versionchanged:: 1.9
Moved from :mod:`pyramid.session` to :mod:`pyramid.csrf` and updated
to use the configured :class:`pyramid.interfaces.ICSRFStoragePolicy` to
verify the CSRF token.
"""
supplied_token = ""
# We first check the headers for a csrf token, as that is significantly
# cheaper than checking the POST body
if header is not None:
supplied_token = request.headers.get(header, "")
# If this is a POST/PUT/etc request, then we'll check the body to see if it
# has a token. We explicitly use request.POST here because CSRF tokens
# should never appear in an URL as doing so is a security issue. We also
# explicitly check for request.POST here as we do not support sending form
# encoded data over anything but a request.POST.
if supplied_token == "" and token is not None:
supplied_token = request.POST.get(token, "")
policy = request.registry.getUtility(ICSRFStoragePolicy)
if not policy.check_csrf_token(request, text_(supplied_token)):
if raises:
raise BadCSRFToken('check_csrf_token(): Invalid token')
return False
return True
[docs]
def check_csrf_origin(request, trusted_origins=None, raises=True):
"""
Check the ``Origin`` of the request to see if it is a cross site request or
not.
If the value supplied by the ``Origin`` or ``Referer`` header isn't one of
the trusted origins and ``raises`` is ``True``, this function will raise a
:exc:`pyramid.exceptions.BadCSRFOrigin` exception, but if ``raises`` is
``False``, this function will return ``False`` instead. If the CSRF origin
checks are successful this function will return ``True`` unconditionally.
Additional trusted origins may be added by passing a list of domain (and
ports if non-standard like ``['example.com', 'dev.example.com:8080']``) in
with the ``trusted_origins`` parameter. If ``trusted_origins`` is ``None``
(the default) this list of additional domains will be pulled from the
``pyramid.csrf_trusted_origins`` setting.
Note that this function will do nothing if ``request.scheme`` is not
``https``.
.. versionadded:: 1.7
.. versionchanged:: 1.9
Moved from :mod:`pyramid.session` to :mod:`pyramid.csrf`
"""
def _fail(reason):
if raises:
raise BadCSRFOrigin(reason)
else:
return False
if request.scheme == "https":
# Suppose user visits http://example.com/
# An active network attacker (man-in-the-middle, MITM) sends a
# POST form that targets https://example.com/detonate-bomb/ and
# submits it via JavaScript.
#
# The attacker will need to provide a CSRF cookie and token, but
# that's no problem for a MITM when we cannot make any assumptions
# about what kind of session storage is being used. So the MITM can
# circumvent the CSRF protection. This is true for any HTTP connection,
# but anyone using HTTPS expects better! For this reason, for
# https://example.com/ we need additional protection that treats
# http://example.com/ as completely untrusted. Under HTTPS,
# Barth et al. found that the Referer header is missing for
# same-domain requests in only about 0.2% of cases or less, so
# we can use strict Referer checking.
# Determine the origin of this request
origin = request.headers.get("Origin")
if origin is None:
origin = request.referrer
# Fail if we were not able to locate an origin at all
if not origin:
return _fail("Origin checking failed - no Origin or Referer.")
# Parse our origin so we we can extract the required information from
# it.
originp = urlparse.urlparse(origin)
# Ensure that our Referer is also secure.
if originp.scheme != "https":
return _fail(
"Referer checking failed - Referer is insecure while host is "
"secure."
)
# Determine which origins we trust, which by default will include the
# current origin.
if trusted_origins is None:
trusted_origins = aslist(
request.registry.settings.get(
"pyramid.csrf_trusted_origins", []
)
)
if request.host_port not in set(["80", "443"]):
trusted_origins.append("{0.domain}:{0.host_port}".format(request))
else:
trusted_origins.append(request.domain)
# Actually check to see if the request's origin matches any of our
# trusted origins.
if not any(
is_same_domain(originp.netloc, host) for host in trusted_origins
):
reason = (
"Referer checking failed - {0} does not match any trusted "
"origins."
)
return _fail(reason.format(origin))
return True
