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Criminal Law and Philosophy
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-021-09585-6
ORIGINAL PAPER
A Review of Elinor Mason’s Ways to be Blameworthy
Andreas Brekke Carlsson1
Accepted: 30 May 2021
© The Author(s) 2021
Abstract
In this review, I summarize Elinor Mason’s Ways to be Blameworthy and raise some
worries concerning three aspects of her book: her account of the knowledge con-
dition on moral responsibility, her notion of blame and its justification as well as
Mason’s conception of extended blameworthiness.
Keywords Mason · Blame · Responsibility
Elinor Mason’s Ways to be Blameworthy (2019) aims to explain the relationship
between our concepts of rightness and wrongness and our concepts of praise- and
blameworthiness. Although it is commonly agreed that there is some kind of con-
nection between our deontic concepts and our responsibility concepts, the exact
nature of this relationship is rarely investigated in detail. Mason’s ambitious and
important book brings together difficult questions that are typically discussed in iso-
lation. The result is a pluralistic account, according to which there are three different
kinds of blameworthiness.
According to Mason, there is a “responsibility constraint” on all concepts of
rightness and wrongness. But it is not easy to spell out exactly what this connec-
tion consists in. Different concepts of rightness and wrongness correspond to praise-
and blameworthiness in different ways. The more objective a theory is, the weaker
the link to praise- and blameworthiness. In chapter 2, Mason develops an account
of subjective obligation where the link between the praise- and blameworthiness
is very close. An agent’s subjective obligation, according to Mason, is to try to do
well by Morality, where Morality is understood as the “true” morality. In order to do
well by Morality the agent needs a sufficient (though not perfect) grasp of Morality.
I thank Anna Drożdżowicz, Leonhard Menges, and Elinor Mason for helpful comments on an earlier
draft. For additional funding, I am grateful to Conceptlab, University of Oslo, (Grant No. 250654,
Research Council of Norway).
* Andreas Brekke Carlsson
andreas.carlsson@inn.no
1
Department of Law, Philosophy and International Studies, Inland Norway University of Applied
Sciences, Lillehammer, Norway
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“Trying to do well by morality is praiseworthy. Not trying hard enough or failing to
try is blameworthy” (74).
Trying thus plays an important role in Mason’s book and chapter 3 provides an
account of this notion. Mason argues that trying is subject to a reflexivity require-
ment: trying to do well by Morality requires that one knows one is trying. This need
not, however, amount to conscious awareness. The knowledge can be tacit, implicit,
or in the background when the agent is acting. Trying, according to Mason, involves
both a general outlook and attitudes, as well as taking the steps the agents believes
most likely to result in doing well by Morality. Correspondingly, failing to try
requires that the agent understands the standards of "true" Morality, and accepts that
they apply to her.
In chapter 4, Mason argues that the notion of subjective obligation correlates with
one kind of moral praise- and blameworthiness, what she calls “ordinary” praise-
and blameworthiness. If an agent tries to do well by Morality, she is praiseworthy;
if she fails to try, or does not try hard enough, she is blameworthy. The reflexivity
requirement allows Mason to tread a middle path in the debate about the knowl-
edge condition on blameworthiness. Mason argues that a grasp of Morality is nec-
essary for ordinary praise- and blameworthiness. However, she does not think this
grasp requires full awareness of the relevant moral facts. Background knowledge is
sufficient.
In chapter 5, Mason contrasts ordinary praise and blame with detached praised
and blame. Ordinary blame (and praise) is communicative. Drawing on Michael
McKenna’s (2012) theory of responsibility, Mason argues that we should see blame
and praise as part of a conversation. Blame includes a demand that the wrongdoer
recognizes their wrongdoing and feels remorse. Ordinary blame is directed towards
members of the moral community who have a grasp on Morality. When such agents
act wrongly, they do so by their own lights. This is why we are entitled to expect the
acknowledgment of wrongdoing as well as remorse from the wrongdoer and why the
communicated blame is felicitous. Detached blame, by contrast, is directed towards
agents who do not have a grasp on Morality. They have not acted wrongly by their
own lights, and blame towards them is not communicative. Detached blame goes
beyond judgments of blameworthiness and can take the form of emotional reactions
like disdain, repugnance or anger, or a modification of one’s relationship with the
wrongdoer.
Chapter 6 concerns excuses. According to objective accounts of moral rightness,
there is a gap between acting wrongly and being blameworthy. After all, one might
have an ordinary excuse: lack of control or ignorance. According to Mason’s account
of subjective wrongdoing, one acts wrongly if one fails to try to do well by Morality,
given one’s available knowledge and control. Violating one’s subjective obligation
thus leaves no room for ordinary excuses. Mason nevertheless claims that there can
be mitigating factors that apply to those who act subjectively wrongly.
Mason also discusses exemptions from ordinary blameworthiness (Chapter 7).
She argues that deep moral ignorance is sufficient for being outside the moral com-
munity. In such cases, only detached, non-communicative forms of blame are appro-
priate. Mason also argues that agents who understand Morality but lack the capacity
to act otherwise might nevertheless be praise- or blameworthy.
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Chapter 8 develops a third form of blameworthiness, what Mason calls “extended
blameworthiness.” People sometimes do bad things inadvertently, or because of
their own bad motives or implicit biases. They may nevertheless have tried hard
to do well by Morality. In such cases the agent will not have acted subjectively
wrongly and thus not be blameworthy in the ordinary sense. Mason argues that such
agents can take responsibility by accepting blame from others and be willing to feel
remorse for what they have done.
Ways to be Blameworthy is a rich and exciting book, full of thought provoking
ideas. It connects several different debates in new ways and provides the reader with
interesting and novel accounts of subjective obligations, the nature and conditions of
blame and blameworthiness. It also provides a more sustained discussion of praise
and praiseworthiness than is common in a literature where the focus typically has
been on the negative side of responsibility. Given that the book is relatively short
(213 pages), there are areas where one could wish for a more detailed development
and defense of the main claims. In the remainder of this review, I will focus on one
such area: Mason’s account of blame- and blameworthiness.
An important claim in Mason’s book is that violating a subjective obligation cor-
relates with ordinary blameworthiness. If the agent acted wrongly, by her own lights,
she is blameworthy. Although there might be mitigating circumstances, there is no
room for excuses. However, a reader might wonder why this should be the case.
Consider first Mason’s account of the conditions of blameworthiness. The knowl-
edge condition on blameworthiness has long been a contentious issue. Attribution-
ists like Nomy Arpaly (2003), Elizabeth Harman (2011) and Angela Smith (2005)
argue that agents who are morally ignorant can be blameworthy as long as their
actions display a morally insufficient quality of will. The proponents of the “search-
light” view on the other hand, including Gideon Rosen (2004), Neil Levy (2011) and
Michael Zimmerman (1997), argue that agents need to be fully aware of the wrong
making features of their actions and of the fact that these actions are wrong. Only
actions and omissions that either are, or can be traced back to, instances of clear-
eyed akrasia are blameworthy. The problem with attributionism is that it makes it
too easy to be blameworthy; the problem with the searchlight view is that it makes it
too hard. On the latter view, many if not most of our morally wrong actions will
be excused. Mason’s account of the conditions for ordinary blameworthiness avoids
these two extremes. She argues that the knowledge requirement for ordinary blame-
worthiness is just the same as for failing to try: knowledge of Morality is neces-
sary, but this knowledge can be in the background; it can be tacit or implicit. Mason
argues that the relevant question is whether the agent should have known better
(86). However, as she points out, the notion of ‘should’ is ambiguous. Whenever an
agent acts wrongly, there is a sense in which she should have acted differently. If the
“should have” attaches to an objective sense of rightness, this hardly settles the issue
of blameworthiness. After all, the agent might have had an excuse for not having
acted as she should have acted in the objective sense. Mason argues that the relevant
notion of “should have” is subjective, in the sense that the agent herself would rec-
ognize that she should have been motivated differently or should have known. “She
should have done things differently, because, by her own lights, she should have.
So crucially, in not doing things differently, she is blameworthy” (89). Applied to
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the knowledge requirement, Mason thinks this subjective sense of should applies to
agents who would have seen that their act was problematic if only they have thought
about it a little longer, or tried a little harder (90). Such agents are blameworthy,
according to Mason, because, they should have acted differently by their own lights.
One may worry that this reply does not properly engage with the argument for the
searchlight view. Proponents of this view argue that we can only be directly blame-
worthy for things over which we have voluntary control. As long as our knowledge
of Morality is merely background knowledge, we cannot use it when we are delib-
erating and choosing what to do. Consider Angela Smith’s (2005) case of a per-
son who forgets her friend’s birthday. The fact that she would have easily remem-
bered about the birthday if she wasn’t so preoccupied, or if she were prompted, does
not make it the case that she, in the moment of action, had voluntary control over
whether she would call her friend or not. It seems that a proponent of the searchlight
view could agree that agents who have background knowledge of Morality should
have acted differently in the subjective sense, but deny that they are blameworthy
for failing to act differently. Even if they should have acted differently by their own
light, they nevertheless have an excuse for not doing so: they lacked the relevant
kind of control necessary for being blameworthy.
One way to reply to this argument would be to adopt a less robust notion of
blame. Proponents of the searchlight view are typically making a first order moral
argument: blame is harmful, and no one deserves to be harmed for what they cannot
control. If blame turns out not be harmful, this argument loses much of its appeal.
Mason herself suggests this kind of reply: “In fact, I do not think that imposing suf-
fering is an essential part of blame, so the burden on me to justify blame is lighter
than on those who think that hostile attitudes are essential” (footnote 12, page 22).
Mason distinguishes her account of blame from punishment by noting that blame
does not necessarily aim at suffering (though it may). But suffering does seem
essential to her account of the blame conversation. Ordinary blame communicates
an expectation that the wrongdoer recognizes her wrongdoing and feels remorse for
what she has done. Accepting blame thus involves feeling remorse. Remorse is nec-
essarily painful or unpleasant. This raises the question of how the pain of remorse
is justified on Mason’s account. In chapter 2, Mason notes that she is not claiming
that agents who violate a subjective obligation deserve the suffering that goes along
with blame. Rather, she wants to defend an account of what makes blame fitting.
Mason does not explain exactly what she means by fittingness. The appropriateness,
or fittingness of blame, on Mason’s account, seems to depend on whether the com-
munication of blame is conversationally felicitous or not. Ordinary blame is appro-
priately directed towards agents with a grasp of Morality; i.e. agents who have acted
wrongly by their own lights. She writes: “What makes it felicitous as communica-
tion is that it reminds the agent of something she already knows” (106). However,
one might wonder whether this provides a sufficient justification for the harm of
the remorse that Mason takes to be an integral and appropriate part of a felicitous
blame conversation. It seems uncontroversial that agents who have acted wrongly by
their own lights can be expected to recognize their own wrongdoing. But it is less
clear why they should feel remorse simply in virtue of having acted wrongly by their
own lights. In cases where they only had background knowledge of Morality, for
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example, it seems that they could admit that they acted wrongly, but maintain, with
Rosen, Zimmerman, and Levy, that their lack of conscious awareness provides them
with an excuse.
Mason also argues that the blamer is normatively entitled to expect acceptance of
blame and remorse “because that is part of what being part of the moral community
involves. It is important to recognize that this is not a first order moral norm. […]
Rather, if [wrongdoers] want to carry on in good standing in the moral community,
they ought to accept my blame. This is a broader hypothetical requirement-accepting
blame, and engaging in blame exchanges is what we have to do if we want to be
fully engaged in our moral community.” (105). This sounds right, once it is estab-
lished that agents who act subjectively wrongly ought to feel remorse. However, I
don’t think that Mason has yet provided this justification. Absent an independent
justification, it seems that we can legitimately ask why membership in the moral
community should require such agents to be pained by remorse.
Similar issues arise in Mason’s account of extended blameworthiness. In chap-
ter 8, she argues that agents who are not blameworthy in the ordinary sense some-
times should take responsibility, by accepting the blame of others and show a will-
ingness to feel remorse. This applies to situations where the agent tries to do well by
Morality but acts wrongly, either inadvertently or because of a bad will or implicit
bias. Mason illustrates extended blameworthiness with the example of Perdita who
has inadvertently lost her friend’s necklace. Mason stipulates that Perdita wasn’t
careless, and took her duties sufficiently seriously. There was no ill will; she sim-
ply forgot where she put the necklace. When blamed by her friend, Perdita could
argue that the blame is misplaced. In a sense, she is correct. She is not blameworthy
in the ordinary sense. However, Mason argues that Perdita should instead accept
the blame, and allow herself to feel remorse. The “should” is not a moral “should”.
Rather, it is a hypothetical should, based on the requirement of relationships. If we
want to take part in personal relationships, we should be willing to take responsibil-
ity. Mason points out that our relationships require that we are emotionally invested
in them. By taking responsibility, Perdita acts as her relationship requires.
It wasn’t obvious to me that our relationships require us to engage in the prac-
tice of extended blame conversations. Consider first the perspective of the blamer.
If relationships can require the wrongdoer to take responsibility, it seems that rela-
tionships also can require the person being wronged to respond with blame and an
expectation of remorse when people with whom one has a relationship make inad-
vertent mistakes. But this seems harsh to me. Arguably, there are other ways of
responding, compatible with the requirements of relationships. Mason points out
that to stop holding one’s partner accountable is a sign that the relationship has dis-
solved and contrasts extended blame conversations with estrangement and alienation
(201). However, there is an important difference between not engaging in blame con-
versations when one’s partner is blameworthy in the ordinary sense, and not doing
it when the partner is not blameworthy. It might be that Mason’s account of taking
blame should rather be understood as a conditional: if inadvertent wrongdoers are
being blamed, then they should accept it. But if the relationship does not require
blame in the first place, it is not obvious that the relationship requires the acceptance
of this blame. The person being blamed might instead apologize, express sadness,
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and a willingness to compensate. Moreover, even if it turns out that relationships
do require this kind of interaction, it does not mean that they ought to be like this. It
seems to me that norms of relationships can be modified and negotiated.
An interesting objection that Mason herself discusses in this context is that
her account may seem to justify the practice of taking responsibility by its conse-
quences. If Perdita is not blameworthy in the ordinary sense, it seems that remorse
would be unfitting. She has a relationship-based reason to feel remorse, but that
would seem to be the wrong kind of reason. The right kind of reason would rather
be that Perdita acted subjectively wrongly, which she, according to Mason, did not.
Mason’s response is that it can be fitting to feel remorse when our agency is ambigu-
ous. Situations where agents try their best, but nevertheless act badly because of
their bad motives or implicit biases, or inadvertent actions, are examples of ambigu-
ous agency, according to Mason. On the one hand they are not deliberate and do not
involve controlled exercise of our agency. On the other, such actions are plausibly
our acts. “They spring from our psychology, our agency is not obviously blocked.”
(182).
It is tempting to read this as an appeal to epistemic humility. If one is uncertain
about whether one is blameworthy, it will in many cases—especially in interpersonal
relationships—make sense to err on the right side and behave as if one is blamewor-
thy. But this is not what Mason has in mind. She emphasizes that these cases are not
instances of ordinary blameworthiness and stipulates that Perdita and other agents
who exemplify ambiguous agency, did not act subjectively wrongly. But this makes
it difficult to understand Mason’s reply. It seems that wrongdoing based on ambigu-
ous agency either makes remorse fitting or not. If it does, agents like Perdita will be
blameworthy in the ordinary sense. If it does not, then there is nothing that makes
her remorse fitting and the wrong kind of reason.
Ways to be Blameworthy is clearly an important contribution to the literature on
moral responsibility. Given limited space, in this review I have discussed only some
of the many interesting and original ideas developed in Mason’s book.
Funding Open access funding provided by Inland Norway University Of Applied Sciences.
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Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published
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