ZFS-LOAD-KEY(8) | System Manager's Manual | ZFS-LOAD-KEY(8) |
zfs-load-key
—
load, unload, or change encryption key of ZFS
dataset
zfs |
load-key [-nr ]
[-L keylocation]
-a |filesystem |
zfs |
unload-key [-r ]
-a |filesystem |
zfs |
change-key [-l ]
[-o
keylocation=value]
[-o
keyformat=value]
[-o
pbkdf2iters=value]
filesystem |
zfs |
change-key -i
[-l ] filesystem |
zfs
load-key
[-nr
]
[-L
keylocation]
-a
|filesystemzfs
mount
-l
will ask for the key and mount the dataset (see
zfs-mount(8)). Once the key is loaded the
keystatus property will become
available.
-r
-a
-n
load-key
.
This will cause zfs
to simply check that the
provided key is correct. This command may be run even if the key is
already loaded.-L
keylocation-r
or -a
,
keylocation may only be given as
prompt.zfs
change-key
[-l
] [-o
keylocation=value]
[-o
keyformat=value]
[-o
pbkdf2iters=value]
filesystemzfs
change-key
-i
[-l
]
filesystem-i
flag may be
provided to cause an encryption root to inherit the parent's key instead.
If the user's key is compromised, zfs
change-key
does not necessarily protect existing
or newly-written data from attack. Newly-written data will continue to
be encrypted with the same master key as the existing data. The master
key is compromised if an attacker obtains a user key and the
corresponding wrapped master key. Currently, zfs
change-key
does not overwrite the previous
wrapped master key on disk, so it is accessible via forensic analysis
for an indeterminate length of time.
In the event of a master key compromise, ideally the drives
should be securely erased to remove all the old data (which is readable
using the compromised master key), a new pool created, and the data
copied back. This can be approximated in place by creating new datasets,
copying the data (e.g. using zfs
send
| zfs
recv
), and then clearing the free space with
zpool
trim
--secure
if supported by your hardware,
otherwise zpool
initialize
.
-l
zfs
load-key
filesystem;
zfs
change-key
filesystem-o
property=value-i
Enabling the encryption feature allows for the creation of encrypted filesystems and volumes. ZFS will encrypt file and volume data, file attributes, ACLs, permission bits, directory listings, FUID mappings, and userused/groupused data. ZFS will not encrypt metadata related to the pool structure, including dataset and snapshot names, dataset hierarchy, properties, file size, file holes, and deduplication tables (though the deduplicated data itself is encrypted).
Key rotation is managed by ZFS. Changing the user's key (e.g. a
passphrase) does not require re-encrypting the entire dataset. Datasets can
be scrubbed, resilvered, renamed, and deleted without the encryption keys
being loaded (see the load-key
subcommand for more
info on key loading).
Creating an encrypted dataset requires
specifying the encryption and
keyformat properties at creation time, along with an
optional keylocation and
pbkdf2iters. After entering an encryption key, the created
dataset will become an encryption root. Any descendant datasets will inherit
their encryption key from the encryption root by default, meaning that
loading, unloading, or changing the key for the encryption root will
implicitly do the same for all inheriting datasets. If this inheritance is
not desired, simply supply a keyformat when creating the
child dataset or use zfs
change-key
to break an existing relationship,
creating a new encryption root on the child. Note that the child's
keyformat may match that of the parent while still
creating a new encryption root, and that changing the
encryption property alone does not create a new encryption
root; this would simply use a different cipher suite with the same key as
its encryption root. The one exception is that clones will always use their
origin's encryption key. As a result of this exception, some
encryption-related properties (namely keystatus,
keyformat, keylocation,
and pbkdf2iters) do not inherit
like other ZFS properties and instead use the value determined by their
encryption root. Encryption root inheritance can be tracked via the
read-only
encryptionroot
property.
Encryption changes the behavior of a few ZFS operations. Encryption is applied after compression so compression ratios are preserved. Normally checksums in ZFS are 256 bits long, but for encrypted data the checksum is 128 bits of the user-chosen checksum and 128 bits of MAC from the encryption suite, which provides additional protection against maliciously altered data. Deduplication is still possible with encryption enabled but for security, datasets will only deduplicate against themselves, their snapshots, and their clones.
There are a few limitations on encrypted datasets. Encrypted data cannot be embedded via the embedded_data feature. Encrypted datasets may not have copies=3 since the implementation stores some encryption metadata where the third copy would normally be. Since compression is applied before encryption, datasets may be vulnerable to a CRIME-like attack if applications accessing the data allow for it. Deduplication with encryption will leak information about which blocks are equivalent in a dataset and will incur an extra CPU cost for each block written.
January 13, 2020 | OpenZFS |